Introduction
In a landmark judgement titled Rammilan Bunkar v. State of UP[i], the Allahabad High Court (‘HC’) has held that a mechanical addition of charge under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), in cases of dowry death, is unsustainable and illegal.
Brief Facts
The Hon’ble Supreme Court (‘SC’) was adjudicating upon a batch petition arising from a similar factual matrix, wherein the accused were charged with causing the unnatural death of their wives within 7 years of marriage by subjecting them to cruelty and harassing them for dowry.
The accused were consequentially tried under common sections, including s. 498A, s. 304B of the IPC and s. 3 & s. 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (DP Act), with an alternative charge under s. 302 of the IPC for murder.
Interestingly, in all appeals, the Trial Courts had exonerated the accused under s. 304B of the IPC, but they went ahead and convicted the accused under s. 302 of the IPC by taking recourse to s. 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (‘Evidence Act’).
The appeals filed against such conviction were disposed of by the HC through a common order dated 30.05.2024. Aggrieved by which, the Petitioner (one of the accused) filed the present criminal appeal.
Issue
i. Whether the Trial Courts justified framing an alternative charge under s. 302 of the IPC in addition to s. 304B of the IPC?
ii. Whether the Trial Courts justified acquitting the accused under s. 304B of the IPC and thereafter convicting them under s. 302 of the IPC taking recourse to s. 106 of the Evidence Act?
Held
The HC observed that the order passed by the Trial Courts in all matters forming a part of the batch petition was flawed and irregular. Hence, the HC directed the Trial Courts to re-conduct the trial. Further, the HC made the following noteworthy observations:-
Since the sphere of operation of ss. 302 and 304B of the IPC are entirely different and distinct, and both have different sets of essential ingredients; one cannot be used as a substitute for the other. HC relied on the SC's decision on Vijay Pal Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttarakhand.[ii]
The Trial Courts had, without the application of mind, mechanically implemented SC’s direction in Rajbir @ Raju & Anr. v. State of Haryana[iii] for framing alternative charge under s. 302 of the IPC in offences of dowry death. The Trial Courts had failed to appreciate the clarification subsequently issued by the SC, wherein it had stated that Rajbir’s case (supra) does not permit the framing of an alternative charge in the absence of any material to substantiate or justify the framing of such charge.
If the evidence prima facie supports and justifies the addition of s. 302 of the IPC, then such a charge under s. 302 of the IPC would be the main charge, not an alternative one.
The accused can be convicted of an offence under s. 302 of the IPC, even if the offence is not included in the charge sheet, provided that the elements of the said offence are prima facie satisfied.
S. 106 of the Evidence Act can be used to convict an accused only in special circumstances and not in a routine manner.
The investigating officer ought to specify the materials collected during a wide-spectrum investigation in his final report to frame the charge under s. 302 of the IPC.
Our Analysis
Through the aforementioned decision, the HC reaffirmed that the onus on the prosecution is to establish its case 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' Neither the investigating officer nor the prosecution can be absolved of their duty to conduct a thorough trial/investigation. They cannot justify their actions by mechanically invoking s. 106 of the Evidence Act to their advantage. It is well established that s. 106 does not shift the burden of proof in a criminal case, which always rests with the prosecution.[iv]
It was also crucial for the prosecution to be admonished for conducting such serious investigations in a loose and careless manner, particularly in the present factual matrix, where, upon failing to establish the commission of an offence under s. 304B of the IPC, or after being exonerated from the said charge, the accused were convicted under s. 302 of the IPC.
The Ld. trial judges mechanically added the latter charge (s. 302 of the IPC/murder) without supporting evidence, allegations, or documents. This mindless addition of s. 302 of the IPC as an additional charge was made while blindly complying with the SC’s directives in Rajbir’s case (supra) without understanding the implications of such a directive. The legal misinterpretation was, however, quickly recognised and rectified by the SC, clarifying that any addition or alteration of a charge by the trial judge should be justified and substantiated by the material on record prima facie. The absence of cogent evidence backing the addition of a murder charge under s. 302 of the IPC is unsustainable under the law. Only when allegations of murder are substantiated and the existing evidence justifies it should the trial judge frame such a charge.
Lastly, the HC highlighted the significant differences between ss. 304B and 302 of the IPC. The burden of proof required to establish that an offence punishable under s. 302 of the IPC has been committed, which is much higher than required for an offence under s. 304B of the IPC. While the presumption of dowry death under s. 304B of the IPC stands until disproved by the accused per s. 113B of the Evidence Act, no such presumption aids the prosecution under s. 302 of the IPC. Thus, using these sections interchangeably or as alternatives is legally untenable. Suppose an accused is compelled to defend against a charge under s. 302 of the IPC and is subsequently convicted under s. 304B of the IPC. In that case, he is unjustly deprived of the opportunity to adequately defend himself, thereby causing grave injustice and violating established legal principles.
End Notes
[i] 2024 SCC OnLine All 3140.
[ii] (2014) 15 SCC 163.
[iii] (2010) 15 SCC 116.
[iv] 2006 (12) SCC 254.
Authored by Aditya Gupta, Advocate at Metalegal Advocates. The views expressed are personal and do not constitute legal opinion.