Introduction
Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of Shajan Skaria v. Union of India[i], addressed two contentious issues under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (‘Act’). The first issue considered was whether s. 18 of the Act imposes an absolute bar on the grant of anticipatory bail under s. 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (‘CrPC’). The second issue examined whether merely having knowledge of an individual’s status as a member of a scheduled caste (‘SC’) or scheduled tribe (ST) while insulting them constitutes an offence under the Act.
Facts of the case
On 24.05.2023, Shajan Skaria (‘Appellant’), in his capacity as the Editor of an online news channel named ‘Marunandan Malayali,’ published a video on YouTube, levelling certain allegations against P.V Srinijan (‘Complainant’).
The Complainant, a member of the Kerala Legislative Assembly (‘MLA’) representing the Kunnathinad constituency, a seat reserved for SCs, felt aggrieved by the video posted by the Appellant. Consequently, he filed a written complaint before the ACP, Central Police Station, Ernakulam, Kerala, inter alia, alleging that the Appellant published the video with the intent to publicize, abuse, and insult the Complainant as a member of an SC.
On the basis of the Complaint filed by the Complainant, a first information report (‘FIR’) dated 09.06.2023 was registered against the Appellant for offences punishable under s.120(o) of Kerala Police Act,2011 (‘KP Act’) and ss.3(1)(r) and 3(1)(u) of the Act.
The FIR indicated that the Appellant, who does not belong to the SC, had published and disseminated a video with disparaging content about the Complainant. The Complainant alleged that the video was uploaded with the intent to humiliate and ridicule him publicly, fully aware that he belongs to the Pulaya community, a Scheduled Caste.
Apprehending his arrest, the Appellant approached the Court of Special Judge for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989, Ernakulam Division (‘Special Judge’) seeking anticipatory bail under s.438 of the CrPC. However, the Special Judge rejected the anticipatory bail application filed by the Appellant, holding that the allegation in the FIR is prima facie sufficient to attract the offence under the Act and the bar of s.18 of the Act prohibits the court from exercising powers under s.438 CrPC.
Aggrieved by this order, the Appellant challenged the decision of the Special Judge before the High Court of Kerala. The High Court, however, upheld the Special Judge’s order, leading the Appellant to prefer an appeal before the Supreme Court of India.
Held
a. Whether s. 18 of the Act imposes an absolute bar on the grant of anticipatory bail in cases registered under the Act?
The Supreme Court allowed the Appellant’s appeal and, relying upon Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India[ii] and Vilas Pandurang Pawar v. State of Maharashtra [iii], observed that if a complaint does not establish a prima facie case under the Act, the restrictions under ss. 18 and 18A(i) of the Act do not apply. Thus, the court is not precluded from granting anticipatory bail to the accused.
The Supreme Court further observed that the expression ‘arrest of any person’ under s. 18 of the Act means that the police can lawfully arrest a person only if the requirements under ss. 41 and 60A of the CrPC are met. Therefore, s. 18 of the Act can only be invoked if a prima facie case is established.
The Supreme Court emphasized that when an accused seeks anticipatory bail, the allegations do not disclose the essentials of an offence under the Act. The court should consider the application under s. 438 of the CrPC and cannot invoke s. 18 of the Act.
The Supreme Court noted that the Complainant’s alleged humiliation stemmed from a publicly available YouTube video, unlike a public gathering. Therefore, courts should examine the complaint’s material to verify its claims. If the prima facie ingredients are not established, s. 18 of the Act does not apply, and the court can consider the plea for pre-arrest bail on its merits.
b. Whether, in the present case, averments in the FIR/Complainants in question disclose any offence under s.3(1)(r) of the Act.
The Supreme Court, while relying upon the decisions in Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand[iv] and Ramesh Chandra Vaishya v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.[v]. held that there was no prima facie case against the Appellant under s. 3(1)(r) of the Act. The Supreme Court observed that although the Appellant may have intended to malign or defame the Complainant, it was not based on his belonging to the SC community. The Court clarified that not all insults or intimidation directed at a SC/ST community member would constitute an offence under the Act unless it is done on the grounds of their caste status. Thus, s. 3(1)(r) can only be invoked if the insult or humiliation is directed at someone because they belong to the SC/ST community, not merely because they are a community member.
The Supreme Court also noted that the term ‘intent to humiliate’ under s. 3(1)(r) should be construed broadly, as it is inextricably linked to the caste identity of the person subjected to intentional insult or intimidation. Relying on State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ram Krishna Balothia [vi], the Court emphasized that ‘humiliation’ under the Act refers to targeting individuals from the SC/ST community due to their caste status, aiming to enforce protection against caste-based discrimination and indignity. Thus, there must be an intention to humiliate based on caste.
c. Whether there is a prima facie case under s.3(1)(u) under the Act against the Appellant?
The Supreme Court held no prima facie case against the Appellant under s. 3(1)(u) of the Act, as the Appellant’s intent was not to promote feelings of enmity, hatred, or ill-will against SC/ST community members. The Court observed that the video published was of a general nature and did not target members of the SC/ST community but only the Complainant. Thus, s. 3(1)(u) of the Act can only be invoked if there is an intent to promote ill-feeling or enmity against SC/ST community members.
d. Whether mere knowledge of the Complainant's identity is enough to constitute an offence under s.3(1)(r) of the Act?
The Supreme Court observed that mere knowledge that the victim is a SC/ST community member is insufficient to attract s. 3(1)(r) of the Act. The offence must have been committed against the person on the grounds that they are a member of the SC/ST community. When determining whether a prima facie case exists against the Appellant, the Court must consider whether the statements were made solely because the Complainant is an SC/ST community member. This affects the decision on whether an arrest is warranted.
The Supreme Court observed that the High Court might have been correct in observing that the video was intended to insult the Complainant. However, it did not consider whether the insult was specifically because the Complainant belongs to an SC community.
Our Analysis
In this case, the ratio rendered by the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether s. 18 of the Act imposes an embargo on filing an application for anticipatory bail under s. 438 of the CrPC. The Supreme Court emphasized that, based on the interpretation of various decisions rendered by the courts on s.18 of the Act, the courts can entertain an application under s. 438 of the CrPC if there is no prima facie case made out against an individual for offences committed under the Act. Thus, it emphasizes the fact that the liberty of a person is paramount, and the Act, which was enacted to protect SC/ST communities, should not be used as a weapon for personal and political vendetta against any individual.
Furthermore, in its decision, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between insulting an individual belonging to an SC/ST community and insulting an individual because they belong to an SC/ST community. Insulting a person for a particular reason, but not with the intention to humiliate them just because they belong to an SC/ST community, cannot be deemed an offence under the Act. On the other hand, if a person humiliates another solely because they belong to the SC/ST community, it can be deemed an offence under the Act. Thus, the penal provisions under the Act should be interpreted in a strict sense.
To conclude, the decision emphasizes the socio-legal importance of the Act as a tool for protecting marginalized communities from humiliation while highlighting the misuse of the Act’s provisions for personal and political vendettas and the need to safeguard individual rights.
End Note
[i] 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249.
[ii] (2020) 4 SCC 727.
[iii] 2012) 8 SCC 795.
[iv] (2020) 10 SCC 710.
[v] 2023 SCC OnLine SC 668.
[vi] 1995) 3 SCC 221.
Authored by Kushagra Gahlot, Advocate at Metalegal Advocates. The views expressed are personal and do not constitute legal opinions.
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